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MR. BALFOUR'S " FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF."
BY GEORGE M. Mc CRIE.
It is a remarkable coincidence that the two fore-
most figures now in the arena of British politics—Mr.
Gladstone, the Prime Minister of the past, and Mr.
Arthur Balfour, the Prime Minister of the future
—
should, in the literary world, be simultaneously en-
gaged in the self-same task—that of the defence of
the Christian faith. Brought up in widely different
schools,—the one, an Anglican High Churchman, the
other a Scotch Presbyterian ; the one, versed in pa-
tristic lore, a lover of traditionalism, and a keen sacer-
dotalist ; the other, every inch a sturdj' Protestant,
but with a strong dash of that metaphysicism which
no educated Scotsman ever wholly lacks—these men,
otherwise so diverse in opinion, agree in rebuking so-
called "Godless Science," and in advocating a prac-
tical reversion, on the part of the thinking world, to
the faith once delivered to the saints. Singular, that
two writers, starting from wholly opposite premises,
should practically reach the same conclusion ;—more
singular still, that men of such undoubted ability and
sincerity, in the face of all the advance of modern
thought, religious, scientific, and philosophic, should
be found to counsel a virtual submission of reason to
authority!
Yet such is the case. Mr. Gladstone's closing
years are to be devoted, we are told, to this supreme
endeavor. Already, in his past controversy with Pro-
fessor Huxley, as in a presently appearing article, in
a popular American edition of the Scriptures, he has
counselled what amounts to a practical retrogression
in modern thought— a more or less literal adhesion to
the Old and New Testament writings, as the only
"rule of faith and manners." And now Mr. Balfour,
similarly persuaded, takes the field somewhat after
the fashion of Berkeley, and, with Berkeley's own
idealistic weapon, seeks to rout the forces of natural-
ism, agnosticism, and scientific " Godlessness," even
as the worthy Bishop sought in his day and by a simi-
lar method, to dispose summarily of all deists, Hobb-
ists, and infidels. In lifting the Excalibur of idealism,
Mr. Balfour handles a trenchant blade, but it is a two-
edged one, which turns every way. It will perhaps
be found that, as in Berkeley's case, the weapon he
uses may turn against himself, destroying the self-
same conclusion which it was invoked to defend.
Mr. Balfour's latest work, 77/c Foundations of Be-
lief,'^ is a suggestive and significant one, but it is nei-
ther bracing nor stimulating. Indeed, the author's
tone throughout seems to us to be one of profound in-
tellectual weariness. It is the confession of a more or
less ignoble intellectual surrender; the Apologia of a
lesser Newman, at the turning of the ways between
reason and faith. It is noteworthy as the contribution
of a brilliant essayist to the endless controversy be-
tween ecclesiasticism and science, but its note is not
a jubilant one— it is one which evidences a tired brain,
a mind which flags before the supreme problems of
life, and which is fain to hark back upon the affirma-
tions of a creed outworn, as being, after all said and
done, perhaps as good and true as any other. Such
moods, born partly of weariness, partly of intellectual
satiety, are not unfamiliar to even the bravest spirits
among us. But in such cases they are transitory;
—
they pass away with the moment of mental, or bodily,
languor which begot them. In Mr. Balfour's case, the
mood has become habitual, even chronic. In effect,
what he says may be summed up in this inconsequent
proposition :
"Since all we know is that nothing can be known, why not
revert to the, at all events time-honored, belief in a Living and
Personal Deity, as our Creator, Sustainer, and Eternal Home ?
Since such a belief is, to say the least, just as likely to be well
founded as any other— since, indeed, the probability lies faintly
in favor of such a hypothesis, as explaining many otherwise in-
soluble life problems, why not entertain it ?"
This shows a tone and a temper impatient and dis-
satisfied with the slow and gradual, though assured,
march of modern science, and eager to find the solid
rock of certainty here and now beneath its feet, at
whatever hazards. It is a tone and a temper, how-
ever, which will fascinate many. Mr. Balfour's Gos-
pel is just the one to suit those who are too indolent
and careless to search personally for the truth which
makes free. It will help to pacify the timid religion-
ist, zealous for the infallibility of the Biblical testi-
mony, and trembling for the Ark of God. It will be
1 The Foundations 0/ Belief : Being Notes Introduetoyy to the Study 0/ The-
ology. By the Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, M.P, London : Long-
mans. 1895. Price, I2S 6d.
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popular—such orthodox utterances of famous men al-
ways are. But for all that it has not the ring of hon-
est conviction in it ; there is nothing of serious pur-
pose or of strenuous endeavor in its half-hearted
pleading—nothing of nobility, nothing of truth !
At the very outset this modern Defender of the
Faith makes some notable slips. His book is mainly
an arraignment of what he calls "naturalism." The
first part of the volume consists of chapters on Natu-
ralism and Ethics, Naturalism and ^Esthetics, and Nat-
uralism and Reason. What, then, it may be asked,
is "naturalism"? Naturalism, in Mr. Balfour's sense,
is the persuasion that we know phenomena, and the
laws governing them, but nothing more. But, as
Professor Huxley well remarks, in the first part of his
criticism of the volume in the Nineteenth Century :
"Mr. Balfour appears to restrict the term 'phenom-
ena ' to those which constitute the subject-matter of
the natural sciences, mental states not being reckoned
among them,"— i. e. the province of psychology, and
hence of consciousness. The attack is really made
against agnosticism; "and agnosticism," continues
Professor Huxley, "has not necessarily anything to
do with naturalism, properly so called." Moreover,
" If the ' natural science ' of Mr. Balfour is unlike any-
thing known to men of science, it follows that the
view of ' naturalism ' founded upon it, and the concep-
tion of empiricism and agnosticism, which are counted
among the forms of naturalism, are equally non-exis-
tent."!
As a consequence of this grave initial blunder, Mr.
Balfour does not fight all along the line of the Chris-
tian defences. His apologetic is really powerless
against those systems of modern thought which take
their stand on the newest results in the fields of phys-
ics, psychology, and philosophy, and which erect
thereon a consistent and reasoned belief as to man's
place and purpose in the economy of the universe, his
evolution from primordial elements, and his necessary
immortality, in conformity with the laws of heredity
and of the conservation of matter and energy. All
this Mr. Balfour evades. "Godless science," with
him, is the foe to be vanquished, and he can descry
none other in the field. Believers in [material] phe-
nomena solely, and agnostic as regards everything
else, have their moral sentiments naturally depraved.
Hence the following passages inter alia :
" Kant, as we all know, compared the moral law to the starry
heavens, and found them both sublime. It would, on the natural-
istic hypothesis, be more appropriate to compare it to the protec.
live blotches on the beetle's back, and to find them both ingeni-
ous.
" If naturalism be true—or rather, if it be the whole truth
—
I Nineteenth Century, March, 1895. In the April number Professor Hux.
ley does not continue his criticism. It will probably be resumed in the follow-
ing issue.
is morality but a bare catalogue of utilitarian precepts, beauty but
the chance occasion of a passing pleasure, reason but the dim pas-
sage from one set of unthinking habits to another ? All that gives
dignity to life, all that gives value to effort, shrinks and fades un-
der the pitiless glare of a creed like this ; and even curiosity, the
hardiest among the nobler passions of the soul, must languish un-
der the conviction, that, neither for this generation nor for any
that shall come after it, neither in this life nor in another, will the
tie be wholly loosened by which reason, not less than appetite, is
held in hereditary bondage to the service of our material needs."
Reason, Mr. Balfour maintains, is very much over-
estimated. All the important things of life are done
without its aid. The subordinate part which it plays
in the conduct of life is, however, more fully dwelt
upon under the heading of the province of authority.
Lastly, under this section, the morality of naturalism
[by which we presume the writer to mean agnosti-
cism] is parasitic in character. Illustrating his mean-
ing by speaking of the parasite which lives, and can
live only, within the bodies of more highly organised
animals, he adds :
" So it is with those persons who claim to show, by their ex-
ample, that naturalism is practically consistent with the mainte-
nance of ethical ideals with which naturalism has no natural affin-
ity. Their spiritual life is parasitic ; it is sheltered by convictions
which belong, not to them, but to the society of which they form
a part ; it is nourished by processes in which they take no share.
And when these convictions decay, and these processes come to
an end, the alien life which they have maintained can scarce be
expected to outlast them."
All that need be said regarding this illustration is
that it is not in the best of taste, that it is not, by any
means, original, and that it conveys a truism, it being
an accepted fact Christianity has invariably claimed a
monopoly of all the virtues.
SOME REASONS FOR BELIEF.
Such is the title of the second part of the volume.
After what has just been said in depreciation of the
functions of reason, it seems a little odd to appeal to
the reasoning faculty as having any share in the deci-
sion of the question.
Scientific data are assailed with the weapons of
idealism, with the view of showing that of all things
the testimony of the senses is the least reliable, as
being prone to error. Science itself contradicts the
popular view, ex. gr. that a green tree is standing in
the next field, by its own explanation of the complex
series of facts which such an impression really repre-
sents. The "red" is not in the rose, it is a sensation
produced in ourselves, and so on. Hence, he says
—
speaking of naturalism :
"We can hardly avoid being struck by the incongruity of a
scheme of belief whose premises are wholly derived from wit-
nesses admittedly untrustworthy, yet which is unable to supply
any criterion, other than the evidence of these witnesses them-
selves, by which the character of their evidence can in any given
case be determined."
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This statement is a singular distortion of admitted
physical and psj'chological facts. It shows to what
straits Mr. Balfour is put in order to reduce rcaso/icd
scientific conclusions to a minimum. Solely on the
ground that physical phenomena have often a surface
appearance at variance with their scientifically ascer-
tained reality, the testimony of the senses is denounced
as "untrustworthy"! Why, one would think that the
self-same senses have played their part in the correct
interpretation— the required scientific correction—of
the surface appearance ! It would be quite as logical
for our author to argue that the "rising " and "set-
ting" of the sun is an erroneous and thoroughly mis-
leading conclusion. Yet are we not content to speak
of the sun as doing so, supplying, if need be, mentally,
the correct explanation of the phenomenon which sci-
ence teaches ? In the same way science instructs us
regarding the true rationale of the appearance of the
green tree in the field : only, as Clifford somewhere
says, " we cannot be pedantic all day," so we are con-
tent to use the ordinary phrase and to assert that the
tree, in all its greenness and other qualities, exists
where we see it. So it does, for all practical purposes.
There is nothing definitely "erroneous" in such a
judgment. Being, however, not a single judgment,
but rather a synthesis of many interdependent judg-
ments, it is capable of analysis, that is all.
Mr. Balfour, however, presses the point still fur-
ther, he says
:
"Anything which would distribute similar green rays on the
retina of my eyes, in the same pattern as that produced by the
tree, or anything which would produce a like irritation of the optic
nerve, or liki modification of the cerebral tissues, would produce
an impression of a tree quite indistinguishable from the original
impression, but it would be wholly incorrect."
This would be an ingenious argument, if it were
not an erroneous one ! The catch lies in the words
which we italicise in the above extract. Expressions
such as similar, like, the same as, etc., ought always
to be employed with the utmost care in argument, and
with a precise understanding arrived at, as to the
sense in which they are so used. If by "similar," in
the above quotation, Mr. Balfour means identical, and
by "like," the same as, then assuredly his argument is
faulty. For the self-same retinal image, optic nerve
irritation, and changes in cerebral tissue would, if re-
peated, only produce the self-same impression which
would not be "incorrect," but wholly accurate—in
other words, would represent the self-same tree! All
the elements which go to form the perceptual synthe-
sis which we cognise as a green tree being present
once more, the original synthesis would again exist
necessarily. If, on the other hand, by the words " sim-
ilar " and "like" in the above extract is meant only
something approaching to, or very nearly the same as,
then the impression generated would not be that of
the tree as formerly viewed, and accordingly it would
not be "indistinguishable," but, on the contrary, quite
distinguishable "from the original impression." In
either case, Mr. Balfour's argument falls.
SOME CAUSES OF BELIEF.
Under this heading, which comprises Part III of
the volume, we have a systematic exaltation of author-
ity at the expense of reason. Authority, with Mr. Bal-
four, stands for that grasp of non-rational causes,
moral, social, and educational, which produces its re-
sults by psychic processes, other than reason. There
are many instances in point. But the objection here
is, that, in many cases—the great majority of cases,
indeed—in which we act without fully reasoning out
the conclusions arrived at, reasoning though behind
the scenes is nevertheless the virtually controlling
power. I find a summons from a coroner on my table,
commanding my presence, in the capacity of a jury-
man, at a certain place and date. I instinctively obey
the summons, postponing all other engagements in
order to do so. But do I act, in such a case, from a
blind submission to the coroner's authority, as Mr.
Balfour would have it? Not at all. My sense of the
imperative nature of the summons is made up, in the
last recess, of various previously reasoned-out convic-
tions : ex. gr., the power of the coroner to summon
me; my duty to the State, and as a citizen ; my knowl-
edge of the penalty for non-attendance, and that I
have no valid ground on which to be exempted from
serving. All this is a very different matter from blind
acquiescence. It is a perfectly reasoned-out process,
even though I may not repeat the several steps of it.
At the last moment, I may elect not to serve, and to
pay the fine for non-attendance, a stronger motive
having meanwhile predominated. Nine tenths of our
daily duties are similarly actuated by previously rea-
soned-out convictions, and such convictions, so stere-
otyped as to become almost instinctive, really give
evidence, not of automatism, or of submission to
authority, but of reason /;/ excelsis.
Instead of authority ruling, as Mr. Balfour puts it,
in the provinces of ethics and politics, science and so-
cial life, we would substitute a complex process of
what might be called abbre-i'iated reasoning. No man
dreams of questioning a scientific premise laid down
by an eminent savant, on the ground that the experi-
ment has not been verified by himself. It is on the
ground of the standing of the savant that it is taken
for granted that his experiment has been genuinely
tested. Such a one, we know, would not, for the sake
of his own reputation alone, hazard a deception. By
a process of reasoning identical with or akin to this,
we, accordingly, accept his statement on trust. Should
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the standing, or bona fides, of the scientific man be
thereafter seriously impugned, we distrust his after-
results—nay, may reject them wholly. All through,
the balance of reason continually weighs the pro and
con. Blind submission to authority, on the other hand,
believes the impossible, the incredible, even like Ter-
tullian, believes in it "because it is impossible"!
Thus taking statements on trust, after deliberation, is
like the system of credit in business. Legitimately
safe-guarded, it is indispensable in the interests of
progress and expansion. We accept many things, on
the testimony of those whom we judge to be reliable,
which we have neither the time, nor the opportunity,
to verify for ourselves. Mr. Balfour, however, slumps
all these cases under one heading—that of authority.
According to this criterion, the use of a table of loga-
rithms would be a submission of our reason to the
authority of the compiler !
SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A PROVISIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
Here are Mr. Balfour's "three or four broad prin-
ciples which emerge from the discussion at this stage.''
We append a brief comment on each :
1. " It seems beyond all question that any system which, with
our present knowledge, and it may be, our existing faculties, we
are able to construct, must suffer from obscurities, from defects
of proof, and from incoherencies. Narrow it down to bare sci-
ence—and no one has seriously proposed to reduce it farther
—
you will still find all three, and in plenty."
This is simply an assertion, denied by nobody, of
the necessary limitations of present-day human knowl-
edge. But the same human knowledge is hourly in-
creasing !
2. " No unification of belief, of the slightest theological value,
can take place on a purely scientific basis—on a basis, I mean, of
induction from particular experiences, whether 'external' or 'in-
ternal.'
"
The expression "theological value" is puzzling.
What does Mr. Balfour mean by it ? Is it that what is
theologically true may be inaccurate scientifically?
3. "No philosophy, or theory of knowledge (epistemology),
can be satisfactory which does not find room within it for the
quite obvious, but not sufficiently considered, fact that, so far as
empirical science can tell us anything about the matter, most of
the proximate causes of belief, and all its ultimate causes, are non-
rational in their character."
The "proximate causes" of belief are guaranteed
to us by the testimony of consciousness itself, which,
so far from being "non-rational," is the only source of
knowledge which we possess. The " ultimate causes,"
again, though hypothetical in character, such as ether,
atom, vibration, undulation, etc., are far from being
non-rational, on that account. They are hypotheses
which coincide with the rest of our natural knowledge,
and are therefore to be accepted as working hypothe-
ses until disproved or displaced,
4. "No unification of beliefs can be practically adequate
which does not include ethical beliefs as well as scientific [sic!]
ones ; nor which refuses to count among ethical beliefs, not merely
those which have reference to moral commands, but those, also,
which make possible moral sentiments, ideals, and aspirations,
and which satisfy our ethical needs. Any system, which when
worked out to its legitimate issues, fails to effect this object, can
afford no permanent habitation for the spirit of man."
Moral sentiments, ideals, and aspirations are all
capable of scientific embodiment in a scientific reli-
gion, having the moral as well as the physical needs
of man fully in view.
All this contention, however, on Mr. Balfour's part,
leads up to his pet theory that every need of man is
bound to receive its " satisfaction " in the universal
plan. Starting from the scientist's need to postulate
the ideas of heat, matter, motion, etc., he insists that
it is equally legitimate, when working in a region not
less real to postulate the existence of a real authority
operating in the affairs of the universe— in other
words, the existence of a final cause, a rational author!
He says :
"Compare, for example, the central truth of theology—
' There is a God'—with one of the fundamental presuppositions
of science (itself a generalised statement of what is given in ordi-
nary judgments of perception), 'There is an independent material
world.' I am myself disposed to doubt whether so good a case
can be made out for accepting the second of these propositions, as
can be made out for accepting the first. . . . Consider, for exam-
ple, this question, 'What is a material thing?' Nothing can be
plainer till you consider it ; nothing can be obscurer when you do."
Now, most persons would think that although the
idea of that objective something which we call "a ma-
terial thing," while strictly and scientifically definable,
leads, in the last analysis, to not a little ambiguity, the
idea of God stands on a somewhat different footing.
The latter is not given to us in the form of a percept.
It is not ours, conceptually, in the sense of a re-cog-
nised percept, it is wholly, and solely, a complex and
variable product of the imagination which
" Bodies forth the shape of things unknown."
It is an idea which fills no place, and bears no share,
in our conception of the universe, save that indefinite,
and wholly visionary, one of Causa Causarum. A crav-
ing, a need exists, persists Mr. Balfour, for the action
of a rational author in the universe. Therefore, the
hypothesis that such a being exists is allowable, in-
deed imperative. In this light, the craving, or need,
would be the measure or standard, according to which
the existence of God, as infinite cause, may be affirmed
—or, it might be added, denied, seeing that, in many
ancient faith-systems, no such craving exists. Again,
if the craving be an index of a necessary satisfaction
awaiting or meeting it, it is clear that the "satisfac-
tion " must bear some natural relationship to the crav-
ing—must, as it were, be modelled to suit it—in order
to be any satisfaction at all. But men's conceptions
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of, and cravings after, the theistic have been as mul-
titudinous as the subjects of these experiences. God,
therefore, would not be the One, but the Many, in the
sense of the infinitely varying, fnstead of man being
made in God's own image, God would be, literally,
made after the fashion, whim, or fancy, of each indi-
vidual man. The criterion is wholly unallowable.
Given a craving for personal, individual immortality.
Does this alone guarantee such an existence beyond
the grave and fate of death ? And if not, why not?
THE CHRISTIAN CREED.
The surprise of the informed and thoughtful reader
will be considerable on finding that Mr. Balfour, on
the strength of premises so scanty as those already
mentioned, boldly makes a salto mortale, at this stage,
from his hj'pothetical Causa Causaium to the deity of
Christianity ! It is true, that he does not, at first,
identify the two—speaking, as he does, of the inspira-
tion of the " one reality," in broad and general terms.
But he soon becomes more definitely anthropomorphic
in his theism. "The evidences of God's material
power," he says, "lie about us on every side." But
"the evidences of His moral interest have to be anx-
iously extracted, grain by grain, through the specula-
tive analysis of our moral nature." As, however, man-
kind are not given to speculative analysis, " I know
not," he says, how this end [the grasping of this tran-
scendent truth] "could be more completely attained
than by the Christian doctrine of the incarnation."
This is, indeed, a transition for which the logical
reader is scarcely prepared, on such short notice.
The hiatus in question has not escaped the notice of
his reviewers, even of those otherwise favorably dis-
posed towards his views. One of these writes as fol-
lows on this point :
"The world, says Mr. Balfour, is an absurdity without crea-
tion and guidance. Very well, infer creation and guidance. More
than this, we have no authority to claim. And then, in a moment,
we suddenly come upon Mr. Balfour speaking of ' a living God '
!
Who is hypostatising the abstract now ? . . . God, by the hypothe-
sis, is a causative and a guiding principle, and there is no possible
right to attribute one shred more of meaning to the conception
than what is supplied by the method of its deduction. Is it need-
ful to discuss the value of this result ? Such a God is worthless
and unmeaning ; the result is as jejune as the process is illegiti-
mate." '
To all of which we very heartily say Amen !
We may admire Mr. Balfour's adroitness, his wealth
of illustration, and brilliant style, but we cannot say
that we admire, or agree with, his logic. His final
conclusions are not contained in the premises with
which he starts. Even his orthodox friends despair
of his methods.
1 Mr. Btilfour'f Philosophy. By G. W. S'Seveqs, in the NfW Revieiu for
Mafcb,
Personally, we do not believe that the volume will
bring satisfaction of mind to any earnest and unpreju-
diced seeker after truth. It will, rather, serve to repel
those who might otherwise be attracted to Christian-
ity, by its forced assumptions and question-begging
arguments. On tlie other hand, he must be a faint-
hearted believer who is in any way strengthened in
the faith by its perusal. A demonstration, which, at
its best, only reaches the idea of a possible guiding
and sustaining /('7i'(V in the universe, and, that issue
hypothetically established, jumps at once to the fur-
ther conclusion that this " power " is no other than
the deity revealed in the Old and New Testament
Scriptures, may command the assent of the unthink-
ing, but will be powerless to convince any one else.
One of our author's most indulgent critics, Mr. W.
T. Stead,' remarks that Mr. Balfour employs the
method of David Hume to support the conclusions of
John Knox. We can only speculate what Mr. Bal-
four's illustrious compatriots would have thought of
the result.
EDUCATION.
BY THOS. C. LAWS.
It seems to be forgotten in most discussions upon
educational questions that the person to be educated
is at least of equal importance to the knowledge to be
imparted. In all education, whether it be literary or
scientific, moral or sesthetic, general or technical, our
first inquiry should always be, what sort of pupil is
the one to be trained ? For the differences between
pupils are not less great than those between the vari-
ous forms of knowledge which we are in the habit of
teaching. Much money might have been saved, many
tempers might not have been soured, many blows
might have been spared, had we been content or cap-
able— for incapacity is at the bottom of much of our
inattention— to see to what kind of study our charge
was adapted. It is true alike of adults and children
that our educational systems will be worthless until
we have learned the value of J. S. Mill's sarcastic
remark, that education is a machine for making people
think alike, and acknowledge that liberty in education
has a value as great as in politics and theology. A
musical training to one who has no "ear" for music
is absurd upon the face of it, and when, as too fre-
quently happens in the case of children, that training
is made strictly compulsory, and shirking it is severely
punished, that absurdity becomes a matter of cruelty.
Not only is the child compelled to try to make himself
competent in a study in which he can never become
competent, but there is laid before him a great temp-
tation to come to look upon all education as a nuisance
and a waste of time, and, smarting under a punish-
\ In ^lie Rcinciv 0/ Reviews for March,
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ment given for " faults " which are not wholly his, but
which have been inherited by him from his parents, to
react against his training to an extent which no amount
of compulsion will ever overcome and to associate
obedience and filial respect with pain and punishment
and wrongs committed against himself. It may be
said generally that wherever a person is really capable
of taking any sufficient and satisfactory interest in a
subject, he will do so spontaneously and without coer-
cion or extraneous prompting. It should be, there-
fore, one of the most important duties of parents and
guardians to study carefully those committed to their
charge, and to make education a rational continuation
of the work which nature herself has begun. Indi-
viduality, diversity of thought and feeling, of senti-
ment and research, is one of the greatest charms of
social life, and a necessity for the right appreciation
of the many-sided universe in which we have our being.
Civilised life is so complex, its divisions so numerous,
the facts included therein of such vast number and
variety, that no one person can expect to fill all posi-
tions, nor to master all the available facts. It should
be the duty of the true educationalist to watch care-
fully the unfoldings of each human mind, and to do
somewhat towards helping its possessor to take his
appointed place in the universe into which he has been
born.
Not that I for one moment encourage the creation
of a nation of specialists. In most matters it may
justly be said that the specialist sees but one side of a
question—his own—and that he judges all questions
by his own particular art or science. But what I do
intend to imply is that as no two persons are born into
the world equally gifted in body and mind, we should
endeavor, in our systems of education, to temper the
wind to the shorn lamb. Greater play should be al-
lowed to spontaneity on the part of the pupil, compul-
sion as far as possible should be avoided, and far less
punishment should be meted out to children because
they fail to come up to a given standard in a given
subject. Every man is not a born linguist, nor a born
scientist, a mathematician, a musician, nor an artist,
but where such gifts exhibit themselves, they should
be fostered, trained in the way that they should go,
developed in such wise that they may be of the great-
est value to the individual when he will have to earn
his own living, fill a certain position in society, and
exercise definite functions in the state. To one who
has no taste for languages it will be mere waste time
to teach the varying intricacies of the French irregular
verbs, for the little he learns of them he will speedily
forget. He will not travel abroad, save with person-
ally conducted parties ; will prefer home trade to for-
eign, or if otherwise, will find at a sufficiently small
cost, in all our great commercial cities, professional
translators and corresponding clerks ready to make up
for his shortcomings. To such a one the literature of
his own country is sufficiently vast and excellent to
occupy all his attention, while most foreign works of
any note are procurable in his own language, in trans-
lations which usually represent the original with a fair
amount of accuracy. And he who has the gift of
tongues will find opportunities for displaying it, even
though his parents, as too frequently happens, should
so far have ignored his talents and his predilections
as to have started him in a course utterly unsuited to
his capacities.
Nevertheless, while these talents should be discov-
ered and trained, it is necessary to give a general
knowledge to every individual, and this knowledge
should be such as will be of the greatest value to him
in after life, whether destined for profit, for citizen-
ship, or for recreation and pleasure. Although it can-
not be said that knowledge in itself is a benefit to any-
one, yet it becomes advantageous when it can be put
to a good purpose, either for the well-being of the in-
dividual or of society at large. All education is di-
rected either towards physical, mental, or moral dis-
cipline, or the accumulation of facts. And here let it
be said that physical education is as truly a part of a
sound education as is the learning of facts, or the dis-
cipline of the mind. When we reflect that the object
of life is to live, and to live as long and as happily as
may be with the least possible trouble to, or inter-
ference with or by those around us, we shall see at
once the value of a good physical training. For on
the health of the body depends the well-being of the
mind. To discipline our minds, too, is a lesson which
most of us need to learn. How few, indeed, do we
see capable of arguing a disputed point without call-
ing up memories of Smithfield and the Tower. Con-
troversialists, whose sole object should be the search
for the truth, are ever eager for victory, and it is not
upon rare occasions that their zeal overcomes their
discretion. Moreover, we must remember that the
next generation depends for its whole being upon this,
and that unless we learn to discipline aright our own
minds we shall find it no easy task to understand those
of another generation and to train them right. But,
undoubtedly, the most important form of discipline is
moral training. And this is precisely the most diffi-
cult to give. Children have been variously likened to
savages and young criminals, of whose natures they
largely partake, and how many children are there who
have to repeat the complaint of David Hoist in Jonas
Lie's celebrated novel Den Fre?nsynte, that "father
was a hard man, who far too little could understand
children"? Much will doubtless be improved in the
future by the alienological study of the evolution of
the mind, and the contouring of its various functions
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not forget that for the imparting of moral discipline
there is necessary not only the reasoning faculty, but
also a wide sympathy, an implacable evenness of tem-
per, and an intimate knowledge of child-nature. Lit-
tle service is done by imparting this form of education
in the shape of aphorisms and injunctions, but as far
as possible every infringement of a» moral rule should
bring about its natural punishment. The child who
dawdles when his parent or nurse is prepared to take
him for a walk should be left behind. Instead of lec-
turing a child at length for wasting his money, further
gifts should be suspended for a season. To Luther
the mind of the child resembled a sheet of white pa-
per, upon which one can write what one chooses. On
the contrary, it might rather be likened to a piece of
newspaper, or a sheet upon which much has already
been written, which must be effaced. Lying, cruelty,
and vanity are far more common among children than
among normal adults. Their impulsiveness is as a
rule greater, and their power of distinguishing right
from wrong less, and it is usually limited to the differ-
ence between parental pleasure and displeasure, more
particularly if the child receive practical evidences
thereof. It should, therefore, be the duty of those
upon whom the duty of training the rising generation
falls, to do their utmost to create or evolve a con-
science, and that one of the highest rectitude. To
effect this it is necessary that right doing should be so
enforced that it becomes, as it were, part of the con-
stitution of. the child, so that moral acts may be per-
formed by habit or reflex action, spontaneously, in-
stantaneously, and automatically, while the diffi-
culty of doing immoral ones is made correspondingly
greater.
Of knowledge other than of a purely disciplinary
character it may be said that it should be primarily
directed towards making the child his own observer,
investigator, and thinker upon matters which require
thought and research. He should be taught never to
rely upon work done by others, which can be equally
done by himself. He should not take statements upon
trust, but should prove them for himself. It is better
for him to work out the interest on a sum of money at
a given percentage than to find it in an interest-table.
In learning languages he should not be permitted to
use the dictionary except when absolutely necessary.
Such training should be given for the most part by
ear, and as part of his daily life. If he be of scientific
tastes he should be taught to make his own electric
batteries, his own cameras, and his own collections,
to mount his own objects, and he might be worse em-
ployed than in binding his own books. Few things
can be worse combated than habits of chronic lazi-
ness, acquired by too great dependence upon others,
and leading ultimately to mischief, unruliness, and
perhaps even crime.
It is the opinion of some that a scientific education
should be paramount, and that little attention should
be paid to literature and the arts. That such is not
the theory put forward here scarcely needs emphasis-
ing. As moral training, many of our great literary
works can scarcely be excelled, and their lessons are
taught in an English which has become classic, and in
a style which has won the admiration of all lovers of
our native tongue. Why, indeed, should we boycott
old Sir Roger de Coverley because Vauxhall Gardens
were not lit with the electric light, or sneer at the rug-
ged prophet of Chelsea, because his economics were
sometimes unsound? Nor must we forget that many
men have united literature and science. We may re-
call the names of Bacon and Goethe, Flammarion and
Lewes, and few men have done so much to advance
the English language in all its manly force and vigor
as Professor Huxley and the late Professor Tyndall.
There seems to me no adequate reason why the two
forms of learning should not be associated together. For
exactitude of observation and impartiality of thought,
a scientific training is almost a necessity, whereas for
extension of sympathy, for keeping alive the senti-
mental, aesthetic, and altruistic feelings, science must
yield place to literature. The statistician might furnish
us with a complete list of all the killed and wounded,
the thefts, rogueries, and blunders of any great war
summed up with exactitude in dollars and cents, yet
he would fail to excite our detestation of the "human
beast " as a man of war to anything like the same de-
gree as Zola by his novel La Dchdclc, or Vassilovitch
by a few strokes of his brush. There is always, no
doubt, a danger that a literary education may degen-
erate into mere book-learning. A member of a cer-
tain university once told me that there the Latin and
Greek languages were not learned that the students
might read their literatures. The theoretical rules of
grammar were simply taught over and over again, and
upon them the degrees were practically obtained. On
the other hand, a purely scientific education tends to
produce callousness and to lead to the conclusion that
every problem in nature is to be solved by the tele-
scope, the microscope, the dissecting-knife, or the pro-
cess of electrolysis. The combination of the two,
however, should unite the advantages of both, and
neutralise their disadvantages.
When I speak of literary education, I mean more
especially the acquisition of a knowledge of the litera-
tures of to-day. The Roman, Hellenic, and Hebrew
literatures ma)' be interesting to some, but neither
they nor the languages in which they are written, are
of utility to the many. One may, therefore, safely
leave them to the consideration of specialists, and fill
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up their places in modern education by such languages
as French, German, and Italian, to which may be
added, for commercial and political purposes, Span-
ish, Russian, and Japanese. In any case, however, it
is advisable to teach a dead language through its
nearest living representative, to lead the student in a
natural way from one in which all things are familiar,
gradually back into another in which everything is un-
familiar. Modern Italian and the old Italian literature
are the best stepping-stones to Latin, just as Saxon
can be most easily learned by one who is conversant
not only with modern English and German, but also
with Middle English literature, to which may with ad-
vantage be added the existing dialects of Yorkshire
and Somerset. It must always be borne in mind that
a dead language differs essentially from a living one
in a most important point, that, whereas the modern
can and should be taught mainly by the ear, the an-
cient can be taught only by its literature. And this
introduces us to another reason for combining litera-
ture with science. Science is learned chiefly by the
eye. A scientific training is pre-eminently a training
in accurate ocular observation. A literary education
is imparted largely by the tongue and ear, and thus
helps to train into correct use and into rapidity and
accuracy of observation other organs with which the
imparting of science has little concern. From the
thesis laid down in the opening paragraphs and from
what has since been said, it is evident that the rela-
tive value of an educational system depends little or
not at all upon the examinations which may be passed
under it, but rather upon the more adequate play
which it gives to all the senses and to all the functions
of the mind. Under the current system the senses
are represented by sight alone, and the mental facul-
ties by an overtaxed memory.
[to be concluded.]
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